Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy, and the formation of international environmental agreements by Narita, Daiju & Wagner, Ulrich J.
Strategic uncertainty, indeterminacy,
and the formation of international
environmental agreements
By Daiju Naritaa and Ulrich J. Wagnerb
aGraduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University, Kita 9 Nishi 7,
Kita-ku, Sapporo 060-0809, Japan, and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Germany;
e-mail: daiju.narita@econ.hokudai.ac.jp
bDepartment of Economics, University of Mannheim, Germany
Abstract
Since the end of the Kyoto Protocol, global climate negotiations have shifted away
from setting binding short-run targets on emissions towards placing long-term lim-
its on global warming. We investigate how this alters the incentives for participation
in a technology-centred international environmental agreement (IEA) where coun-
tries choose between conventional abatement and a breakthrough abatement tech-
nology that exhibits a network externality. When switching technologies is costly,
we obtain that equilibrium adoption is indeterminate because the future adoption
rate is subject to strategic uncertainty. Participation in an IEA that mandates the
adoption of the breakthrough technology will be complete only if countries expect
that all other countries will adopt eventually. Long-run temperature targets can be
regarded as a device to coordinate countries’ expectations on that outcome.
JEL classifications: Q54, O33, H87.
1. Introduction
In recent years, a global consensus has emerged that explicit long-term targets for the emis-
sions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) are meaningful for promoting the mitigation of climate
change. For example, both the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 and the Paris Agreement in
2015 make explicit reference to a 2 long-term target for global warming.1 The European
Union currently pursues the target of reducing GHG emissions by 80% to 95% by 2050
(compared to 1990 levels), and the group of G7 countries agreed to reduce emissions by
40% to 70% by 2050 (compared to 2010 levels). Targets such as these can help pollution
abatement in the long-run by promoting large-scale investments in research and
1 In addition, the Paris Agreement also states the need for ‘pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5C above pre-industrial levels.’
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development of new technologies that will be deployed only in the (distant) future, such as
nuclear fusion or carbon capture from the air.
Does the mere existence of a long-term target make countries more willing to engage in
an international environmental agreement (IEA) in the near term? The answer to this ques-
tion is not clear because compliance with the target cannot be taken for granted. What
seems clear, however, is that meeting the long-term targets mentioned above will require a
series of technological breakthroughs to achieve a decoupling of economic growth and car-
bon emissions. In that sense, the existence of a long-term target—for as ambitious or ideal-
istic as it may seem—raises an expectation among the stakeholders that breakthroughs will
eventually occur. This feature of targets begs the question of how expectations about
cooperation in the future can influence the formation of IEAs in the present. The literature
on self-enforcing treaties has highlighted the role of coordination when participation in an
IEAs hinges upon a tipping point (Barrett, 2003, 2006)2 but little is known so far about
how coordination can be achieved when treaty formation takes place over time.
This study shows that expectations about collective pollution abatement in the future
can influence the formation of IEAs even in the near term. We model treaty formation as a
dynamic game of technology choice where country behaviour is conditioned by a network
externality associated with one of the abatement technologies, and by switching costs that
are convex in the number of countries that switch technologies. The model gives rise to two
types of equilibrium dynamics of technology adoption. In the first case, adoption follows a
determinate path which leads to either full cooperation or no cooperation, depending on
the initial state. In the second case, the dynamics are indeterminate, with stable paths lead-
ing to both full cooperation and no cooperation. The path chosen depends on countries’ ex-
pectations. That is, the size of a self-enforcing treaty is driven to some extent by subjective
beliefs that countries hold about their ability to coordinate policies. This case emerges
when countries are patient, face a low switching cost, and when there are high scale effects
of operational cost. In the case of climate change, such an indeterminacy in the adoption of
abatement technologies provides a rationale for negotiating long-term abatement targets
that align expectations of countries on mutually beneficial diffusion trajectories.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a basic two-stage model with
frontrunner and follower countries of a new abatement technology to illustrate how inde-
terminate dynamics could emerge. Next, we generalize the model by allowing countries to
choose the timing of treaty adoption. We discuss both a two-period version of the model
(in Section 3.1) and an infinite-horizon game (in Section 3.2), and derive the equilibrium
dynamics in Section 3.3. Section 4 discusses the results of the model, and concluding re-
marks are given in Section 5.
2. A model of technology adoption with frontrunner
and follower countries
We consider the formation of an IEA that regulates pollution abatement by multiple
technological options. Here, we set the focus of the model discussions on the adoption of a
technology that involves a network externality. Network externalities are known to create
strategic complementarities that may lead to tipping points. Our model focuses on the
2 The concept of tipping points used in this context relates to the seminal work by Thomas Schelling
(1978). For a more recent, informal treatment, see the book by Malcolm Gladwell (2000).
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diffusion process of an abatement technology which is not instantaneous but occurs over
time. In combination with the network externality, the delay engenders strategic uncer-
tainty about future adoption decisions, transforming coordination on the good outcome
into a non-trivial problem.3
Network externalities have been alleged to play a role for various IEAs. For example,
Barrett (2003, Chapter 9) discusses the equipment standards for oil tankers set by the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), which
aim to reduce oil discharge to the sea at the time of exchange of ballast water and oil in the
tank. With the equipment standards, tanker owners reap greater benefits from installing
new equipment as more ports comply with the agreement, hence favouring higher partici-
pation in the treaty after the group of participating countries reaches a critical size. Another
example is the development and production of substitute products for CFCs after the latter
were regulated by the Montreal Protocol. It is conceivable that, once the market size of the
substitutes became large, DuPont and others producers stood to gain more from producing
the substitutes than from producing CFCs and thus preferred a treaty with universal partici-
pation (e.g., Parson, 2003; Sunstein, 2007). In the context of climate change, network
externalities will likely arise in the deployment of hydrogen-based transportation systems,
specifically when combining a new automobile technology and a supporting infrastructure
of fuel supply. Moreover, in a network of carbon capture and storage (CCS) operations
whose capture and storage sites are linked to each other by pipelines for carbon dioxide,
the costs of accessing the CCS network facing an emitter are likely decreasing in the number
of other emitters using the network.
For an illustration of the problem we are interested in, we start by discussing a simple
case where countries are grouped into frontrunners and followers, and changing groups is
not allowed.4 Our model setup extends Barrett’s (2006) model of a treaty on technology
adoption. Countries have a choice between conventional abatement q and the adoption of
‘breakthrough technology’ labelled ‘Technology X’. The latter has the distinctive features
that it generates zero emissions and exhibits increasing returns to adoption. In Barrett’s
model, a one-shot game is played among N countries, where:
pi ¼ bx xi þ
XN
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is the payoff function for country i, xi is the indicator of adoption of Technology X by
country i (xi 2 f0; 1g), qi is country i’s abatement rate by using the conventional technol-
ogy, and bx, cx, b, c0 are strictly positive coefficients representing the marginal benefit of
adopting Technology X, the total cost of using Technology X, the marginal benefit from
conventional abatement and the marginal cost of conventional abatement, respectively.
Barrett has shown that this one-shot game gives rise to a ‘tipping treaty’ as both universal
adoption and non-adoption of Technology X are Nash equilibria. If the equilibria are
3 Strategic uncertainty arises not due to stochastic elements in the payoff functions but due to the
uncertainty concerning the actions and beliefs of other players.
4 This assumption is relaxed in Section 3 below, where each country is allowed to switch between
technologies at any time.
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ranked, successful coordination among the countries in favour of technology adoption in-
creases the payoff for at least some of them.
Using functional forms similar to Barrett’s, we now show that the addition of a temporal
dimension limits the possibility of coordinated actions by countries and is conducive to a
pattern of indeterminate adoption dynamics. The prospects for successful coordination are
worse than in the one-shot game because some countries are unable to adopt the technology
at a given moment in time.
We consider a game in two stages where each country belongs to one of two groups,
technological frontrunners or followers. Decisions of technology choice by countries are
made sequentially. In period 1, group 1 (i ¼ 1; . . . ;M where M < N  1) countries—
technological frontrunners with the technical capacity to use Technology X from the
beginning—make a decision about whether they introduce Technology X. Group 2 coun-
tries (i ¼Mþ 1; :::;N)—followers—acquire the ability to introduce Technology X only in
period 2. The assumption of sequential decisions is chosen for the sake of simplicity and to
reflect two types of costs, namely: (i) a prohibitive cost of reverting from a new abatement
technology to the conventional one; and (ii) a prohibitive cost facing some countries associ-
ated with the early adoption of a new technology. These assumptions will be relaxed in
Section 3 below where we consider a simultaneous-moves game and reversible technology
choices.
Group 1 countries (frontrunners) adopt Technology X in period 1 if the present value
expected payoff for individual countries favours adoption. That is, when deciding on adop-
tion or non-adoption, frontrunners seek to maximize their individual payoffs rather than
joint payoffs. The present value expected payoff for countries 1; . . . ;M evaluated in period
1 is given by:
Pi ¼ pt¼1i ðx11; . . . ; xi1; . . . ;xM1Þ þ bE ½pt¼2i ðx12; . . . ; xi2; . . . ; xN2Þ
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where xjt 2 f0;1g is the indicator for country j’s adoption of Technology X in period
t 2 f1; 2g, and b 2 ð0;1Þ is the discount factor.
We now show that, in certain cases, rational decision-making by countries can lead to
more than one possible outcome. Which one of them will be realized depends on what
countries expect at present. Suppose that the adoption of Technology X in period 1 makes
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frontrunners better off only if Technology X is also adopted by followers in period 2. This
is true if the following conditions are satisfied:5
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Figure 1 depicts the payoff schedules corresponding to this case. Non-adoption by all
countries in both periods is one Nash equilibrium of the game, yet it is dominated by the
other Nash equilibrium in which all countries adopt by the end of period 2. However,
because the decision on technology adoption is taken sequentially, a coordination prob-
lem arises in both periods. For instance, even if frontrunners manage to coordinate on
adoption in period 1, coordination might fail in period 2 as followers might still choose
non-adoption of Technology X. Conversely, conditions (3) and (4) imply that adoption
of Technology X by frontrunners is not optimal if followers do not follow suit. And fol-
lowers have no incentive to adopt Technology X if frontrunners have not adopted
Technology X beforehand.
As the incentives of the two groups are interrelated in a circular fashion there is more
than one possible outcome. The outcome could in fact be determined by frontrunners’
expectations about future actions by followers. Success or failure of treaty coordination
in period 2—and hence the rate of technology adoption in the future—is subject to stra-
tegic uncertainty in period 1. That is, unless one places additional assumptions on the
structure of expectations, frontrunners decide on technology adoption based on their
beliefs about the future outcome. Despite the subjective nature of these beliefs, front-
runners determine the eventual adoption rate of Technology X by directly shaping the
followers’ incentive for technology adoption in period 2. As a consequence, the diffu-
sion of Technology X could be driven by a subjective factor, and followers have little in-
fluence in shaping such subjective beliefs. Previous analyses have given little attention
to this issue, as they have been based on a one-shot game of technology adoption where
the problem of coordination boils down to a matter of successful political negotiations
at one point in time. Such a framework rules out the intertemporal coordination prob-
lem we examine in this paper.
To be sure, the problem of multiplicity arising in the two-period model we consider here
could be avoided if countries had a way of committing themselves to technology adoption
in the long-run, or alternatively, if they firmly expect that the actions taken by other coun-
tries will be collectively rational responses to their own actions, even in the long-run. In
practice, however, countries may be hard-pressed to find such a commitment device given
5 Note that a country with the conventional technology abates q ¼ bc0 . For the frontrunners’ payoff to
adoption we use that the payoff is given by: Pi ¼ bxM  cxN ðN M þ 1Þ þ b bxN  cxN
 
if in
period 2 all followers unanimously adopt Technology X, and by:
Pi ¼ bxM cx
N
ðN Mþ 1Þ þ b bxM cx
N
ðN Mþ 1Þ þ b
2
2c0
ðN MÞ
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if no follower adopts Technology X. Finally, payoffs are given by Pi ¼ b22c0 ðM  1Þ þ b b
2
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if no country adopts X throughout the two periods.
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that technology implementation covers a long time span and that political decision-makers
face uncertainty about future election outcomes, economic growth, and the pace of techno-
logical progress. Perhaps as a reflection of this fact, the Kyoto Protocol had a commitment
period of only five years.
The simple model discussed in this section shows that the outcome of a technology-
oriented treaty is partly determined by members’ subjective beliefs about future technology
adoption, or, more precisely, about the collective capacity to coordinate technology adop-
tion in the future. Countries’ perceptions might be influenced by visible commitments to
(a)
Fig. 1a. Adoption incentives under irreversibililty: payoff to frontrunners.
(b)
Fig. 1b. Adoption incentives under irreversibility: payoff to followers.
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solving an international environmental problem, in addition to adopting the breakthrough
technology, such as the voluntary adoption of a long-term emission target.
3. Indeterminate technology diffusion when countries
choose the time of adoption
This section extends the baseline model by dropping the assumptions of irreversibility and
of a fundamental asymmetry between frontrunners and followers. We rather allow for tech-
nology switching in both ways, i.e., both adoption and abandonment of Technology X are
possible at a cost. We show that the two-stage game can have multiple equilibria as in the
previous section, and that the solutions to the infinite-horizon game resemble those of the
two-period case. We also discuss the equilibrium dynamics of the infinite-horizon case.
3.1 Two-period case
We retain the assumption of two periods but now assume that M0 countries ð0  M0  NÞ
have adopted Technology X already before period 1, and that DM1 countries seek the intro-
duction of Technology X in period 1. Note that here we use a general formulation of M0
that does not require M0 to be zero (although it can be). In so doing, we account for the
possibility that Technology X has been adopted by some countries because of existing or
past treaties, or for reasons unrelated to climate change. By introducing an assumption of
switching cost, which is to be described below, we eliminate the distinction between front-
runners and followers used in Section 2. That is, the cost structure and technological cap-
acity are assumed to be identical for all countries, and all countries can adopt Technology
X from period 1.
In addition to the model primitives described in the previous section, we introduce a
term SC representing the marginal costs of switching the technology. We assume that SC in-
creases with the number of countries switching in the same time period. This assumption is
motivated by the observation that adopting a new technology often requires the installation
of new physical capital. If the industries that provide the new technology and installation
services operate with decreasing returns to scale (e.g., because some production factors are
fixed), the resulting supply curve of installation services is upward sloping, and hence mar-
ginal costs are increasing with the number of entities switching at a given time.6 A similar
logic is used by Mussa (1978) and Krugman (1991) for their modelling of cross-industry
switching costs.
We adopt this formulation to our case and assume that a switching country incurs costs
SC ¼ fDM1, where f is a positive constant and DM1 is the number of countries adopting
Technology X. Note that SC concerns pure adjustment costs for the adopting countries and
is independent of the existing adopters of the technology—hence, it is not a function of M0
6 For example, convex costs are likely to arise when countries switch from nuclear energy to other
forms of carbon-neutral electricity generation, as was decided by the German government after
the Fukushima nuclear accident (‘Energiewende’). Since Germany is the only country that has
taken this step so far, it will be able to import cheap nuclear power from other European countries
during the transition to a nuclear free electricity supply. However, if other European countries
adopt similar decisions, this is bound to drive up the initial cost of technology switching as coun-
tries would bid up the price of (nuclear) power. Moreover, unchecked growth in transnational elec-
tricity trade could lead to congestion on the European transmission grid.
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but only of DM1. We assume that f >
cx
N ð1 þ bÞ, i.e., the switching cost outweighs the (pre-
sent-value) externality effect on running costs for Technology X. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that a symmetrical moving cost is incurred when DM1 countries abandon
Technology X and switch to the conventional abatement.
Countries decide upon adoption taking into account the one-time switching cost as well
as the present-value gain associated with using Technology X instead of the conventional
abatement option. Let k denote this gain. Note that individual countries make decisions ac-
cording to their own expected payoffs, and thus k represents the gain for individual coun-
tries, not for all countries. k is a function of M0, DM1, and DM2 (the number of countries
that switch technologies in period 2) given by:
kðM0;DM1;DM2Þ ¼ ð1 þ bÞk1ðM0Þ þ k2ðDM1;DM2Þ: (5)
where k1 and k2 are defined as:
k1ðM0Þ ¼ bx  cx
N
ðN M0 þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
(6)
k2ðDM1;DM2Þ ¼ ð1 þ bÞDM1 cx
N
þ bDM2 cx
N
(7)
The balance of k and the switching cost determines the number of adoption or abandon-
ment of Technology X in period 1. Let us first consider the case of progressive technology
adoption, i.e., the number of adopters of Technology X increases over time. Then there is a
maximum value of DM1 (less than N M0) such that the payoff gain from switching from
conventional abatement to Technology X is positive (recall that a larger DM1 reduces the
expected payoff of adoption because of the switching cost). In equilibrium, the number of
countries switching technologies in period 1, DMe1, is given by the largest integer to satisfy:
kðM0;DM1;DM2Þ fDM1 (8)
In other words:
kðM0;DMe1;DM2Þ fDMe1 (9)
and:
kðM0;DMe1 þ 1;DM2Þ < f  ðDMe1 þ 1Þ: (10)
By contrast, countries might expect that others will abandon Technology X in period 2. As
Technology X is attractive only with a large number of adopters, the fear of collective aban-
donment gives those that have adopted Technology X an incentive to abandon it. As above,
switching costs limit the magnitude of abandonment in this period. For a set of negative
DM1 that satisfy:
kðM0;DM1;DM2Þ   fDM1 (11)
the number of countries that abandon Technology X in period 1, DMe1, is given by the inte-
ger with the largest absolute value in this set.
It is straightforward to show possible cases in which the outcome is indeterminate, so
that expectations about future outcomes can influence the future outcomes themselves.
Figure 2 depicts the case where M0 is located to the left of the tipping point
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A—mathematically, k1ðM0Þ ¼ 0. We prove in Appendix A.1 that there is always at least
one combination of (DM1;DM2) satisfying (11) and DM1;DM2  0 (Fig. 2b). Under certain
conditions, there may also be a combination of (DM1;DM2) satisfying (8) and DM1;DM2 
0 (Fig. 2a). To see this, notice that—by a logic similar to the one used to derive condition
(8)—the number of countries that adopt Technology X in period 2, DMe2, is given by the
largest integer of DM2 to satisfy the inequality:
k1ðM0 þ DM1 þ DM2Þ fDM2 (12)
(a)
Fig. 2a. Adoption incentives with costly technology switching: technology adoption.
(b)
Fig. 2b. Adoption incentives with costly technology switching: technology abandonment.
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The above conditions (8) and (12) are equivalent to:
N
cx
k1ðM0Þ þ 1  f N
cxð1 þ bÞ
 
DM1 þ b
1  bDM2  0 (13)
N
cx
k1ðM0Þ þ DM1 þ 1  f N
cx
 
DM2  0 (14)
and can be satisfied by a set of weakly positive ðDM1;DM2Þ. For example, positive DM1
and DM2 exist if
f N
cxð1þbÞ  1 is very small (recall that, by assumption,
f N
cxð1þbÞ  1 > 0) and
there is a number DM2 that satisfies:
b
1  bDM2 > 
Nk1ðM0Þ
cx
(note that k1ðM0Þ < 0). An analogous reasoning can be developed for the case in which
M0 is located to the right of the tipping point.
In summary, we have shown that the dynamics of technology switching may be uniquely
determined in the direction of either increasing adoption or abandonment, depending on
the initial state of technology adoption. However, the system may also have feasible solu-
tions for both directions of technology adoption and abandonment, in which case the out-
come is determined entirely by countries’ expectations.
3.2 Infinite-horizon game
Here we show that similar patterns to the ones described in the previous section emerge in
the case of an infinite-horizon game of technology adoption. In this setting, the effect of ac-
tions at any given stage is cumulative so that final outcomes differ drastically, depending on
both the model primitives and players’ expectations. There are two fundamentally different
scenarios. In the first one, the dynamics are determinate, in the sense that equilibrium play
always leads to a unique outcome, either a universal adoption or zero adoption. In the se-
cond scenario, the dynamics are indeterminate, so that expectations about future outcomes
influence the future outcomes themselves, akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy.
We analyse an infinite-horizon version of the game developed in the previous section.
Play starts in period 0 with an initial number M0 of adopters. As in the previous section, we
assume that 0M0 N to allow for the possibility that some countries have already
adopted Technology X. Countries maximize the present value of cumulative expected fu-
ture payoffs associated with their chosen technology. We focus on subgame perfect equili-
bria with the feature that countries immediately begin an optimal transition to either full
adoption or no adoption—which one depends on M0, payoff parameters, and expectations.
Once this stage-game Nash equilibrium is reached, it will be repeated indefinitely as players
have no incentives to further deviate. Since indefinite Nash play is a subgame perfect equi-
librium of the continuation game, we can use backward induction to determine the indi-
vidually rational transition towards this state. In the following exposition, we first consider
the case in which all countries eventually become adopters of Technology X. An analogous
reasoning can be made for technology abandonment, as shown below.
Due to switching costs, universal adoption does not occur in a single period but will
take place in L batches DM1;DM2; . . . ;DML1;DML where
XL
l¼1 DMl ¼ N M0:
Consider the last batch of DML ¼ N ML1 of adopters. The relative payoff to adoption
for these countries is given by:
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kL ¼ 1
1  b bx 
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ðN M0 þ 1Þ  b
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2c0
þ cx
N
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l¼1
DMl
 !" #
(15)
A Nash equilibrium in this subgame requires that kL fDML where DML ¼ N ML1.
Working backwards, in period L—1 a group of DML1 countries adopting Technology X
earns relative payoffs:
kL1 ¼ 1
1  b bx 
cx
N
ðN M0 þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
þ cx
N
XL2
l¼1
DMl þ DML1 þ bDML
 !" #
(16)
For there to be exactly DML1 adopters in Nash equilibrium, adoption must make all of
them weakly better off, i.e.:
kL1  fDML1: (17)
However, any additional adopter of Technology X must be strictly worse off:
kL1 þ cx
N
< f ðDML1 þ 1Þ: (18)
Iterating backwards, we obtain the relative payoff to adoption on the equilibrium path for
the kth batch of adopters, k 2 f1;L 1g:
kk ¼ 1
1  b bx 
cx
N
ðN M0 þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
þ cx
N
Xk1
l¼1
DMl þ
XL
l¼k
blkDMl
 !" #
(19)
and the equilibrium conditions:
kk fDMk (20)
^ kk < fDMk þ f 
cx
N
(21)
For given kk; conditions (20) and (21) pin down the number of adopters in a Nash equilib-
rium at stage k. Once all countries have adopted in period L, the relative payoff to adoption
in all subsequent periods s is constant and given by kLþs ¼ 11b bx  cxN  b
2
2c0
h i
for
s ¼ 0;1; . . .. Since this term is positive, no country has an incentive to unilaterally abandon
Technology X.
We use this property to characterize the evolution of the relative payoff to adoption
along the equilibrium path. The relative payoff to adoption for countries in the kth batch of
adopters is given by:
kk ¼
XL
s¼k
bsk bx  cx
N
ðN Ms þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
 
þ b
Lkþ1
1  b bx 
cx
N
 b
2
2c0
 
(22)
The difference in the relative payoffs to adoption for two subsequent batches of adopters k
and kþ1 can be written as:
kkþ1  kk ¼ dkk  ð1 þ dÞ bx  cx
N
ðN Mk þ 1Þ 
b2
2c0
 
(23)
where d  1bb . See Appendix A.2 for a derivation of this equation. Along with the inequal-
ities (20) and (21), eq. (23) characterizes the dynamics of technology adoption in subgame
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perfect equilibrium. As in Section 3.1 above, the conditions for an equilibrium in which all
countries switch back to the conventional technology can be derived in an analogous
fashion.
3.3 Equilibrium dynamics
To analyse the dynamics of technology adoption along the equilibrium path, it is conveni-
ent to model the rate of technology adoption as a continuous variable c ð0 c1Þ. The
number of countries adopting Technology X is thus given by dcNe. Similar to the case dis-
cussed in the previous section, the equilibrium level of countries switching at each time
period is one that balances the net present value of switching and the marginal switching
costs for all countries. Along the equilibrium path, the net present value of switching from
the conventional abatement to Technology X at period t is given by:
kt ¼
X1
s¼t
bst bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
: (24)
Following the same logic as in the previous sub-sections, the marginal switching cost for
countries switching technologies between t and t þ 1 is proportional to ðctþ1  ct) and
defined as Fðctþ1  ct) where F is a constant. For kt continuous in c, conditions (20) and
(21) boil down to the difference equation:
Fðctþ1  ctÞ ¼
1
1 þ d ktþ1: (25)
A second difference equation (derived in Appendix A.3) governs the evolution of kt:
ktþ1  kt ¼ dkt  ð1 þ dÞ bx  cxð1  ctÞ 
b2
2c0
 
: (26)
As the length of a time period goes to zero, the system of difference eqs (25) and (26) can be
approximated by the differential equations:
F _c ¼ 1
1 þ d k (27)
_k ¼ dk ð1 þ dÞ bx  cxð1  cÞ  b
2
2c0
 
(28)
This representation allows for a more tractable analysis of the dynamics along the equilib-
rium path. Note that the system describes the dynamics of technology adoption following
the countries’ individual payoffs. A similar discussion for the social optimum is presented
in Appendix A.4. Eqs (27) and (28) define a system of linear differential equations the solu-
tion to which is given by a combination of exponential functions. If:
0 < bx þ cx þ b
2
2c0
< cx (29)
the system has a tipping pattern, i.e., both universal adoption and zero adoption of X are
long-run (continuation) equilibria. In this case, the paths of k and c are obtained by tracing
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them backwards from two long-run equilibria where c¼0 or c¼1. The roots of the
exponential functions determining the system are given by:
q ¼ 1
2
d6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d2  4cx
F
r" #
(30)
Note that the roots can be both real and complex depending on the parameter values, as
the term d2  4cx=F can be either positive or negative. The system dynamics exhibit re-
markable differences depending on which type of root prevails in eq. (30).
With a real root, the system is determinate and hence a sequence of countries’ decisions
always lead to a unique outcome. This case is depicted in Fig. 3a. Starting at the tipping
point A, either of the two long-run equilibria can be attained as the dynamics evolve
(a)
Fig. 3a. Equilibrium dynamics in the infinite horizon game: determinate case (real roots).
(b)
Fig. 3b. Equilibrium dynamics in the infinite horizon game: indeterminate case (complex roots).
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through a sequence of decisions governed by the equilibrium conditions (27) and (28).
The graph shows that each value of c other than A corresponds to at most one point on one
of the two trajectories. In other words, the initial state of adoption c0 uniquely determines
the long-run diffusion rate of Technology X. If c0 > A (c0 < A) universal (zero) adoption
results in long-run equilibrium.7
In contrast, expectations play a prominent role when eq. (30) has a complex root. In this
case, the trajectories show oscillatory patterns, and their arms could cover a wide range of pos-
sible values for c. When the two arms overlap over an interval of c—as is depicted in Fig. 3b—
the initial state does not determine the direction of the path. In fact, there is an infinite number of
feasible trajectories that the system can take. Thus, the model primitives do not condition coun-
tries to follow a unique equilibrium path. Rather, it is countries’ expectations about future adop-
tion of Technology X that pace the growth (or decline) of technology penetration. Even if there is
a feasible equilibrium path leading to the universal adoption of Technology X (for example, the
path through point Pc in Fig. 3b), an expectation held by non-adopters that diffusion will not
happen could prevent the initial group of adopters from taking this path. Instead, they might fol-
low the trajectory to the zero adoption (for example, the path through point Pd in Fig. 3b).
4. Discussion
4.1 Patterns of technology choice
The dynamic model highlights two distinct patterns of technology choice under a technol-
ogy treaty which deserve further discussion from a policy point-of-view. In the determinate
case, there is a unique equilibrium path leading to the long-run outcome. This outcome can
be either universal or zero adoption and is uniquely determined by the initial state of tech-
nology adoption c0 and by the tipping point:
c	 ¼ 1  bx 
b2
2c0
cx
: (31)
Only if the initial proportion of adopters is sufficiently large, c	 < c0, will the technology
be adopted by everyone in the long-run.8 Otherwise, all countries will switch back to the
conventional technology. The tipping point is likely to be lower the more affordable the
breakthrough technology, the more expensive the conventional technology and the larger
the relative benefits of Technology X compared to those associated with the conventional
technology. In this scenario, the earlier results by Barrett (2006) and Hoel and de Zeeuw
(2010) go through and the coordination problem is negligible.
However, this is not true if the technology is such that the long-run outcome is indeter-
minate and depends on expectations, akin to a self-fulfilling prophecy. Eq. (30) implies that
7 Adoption could take either of the trajectories if c0 ¼ A.
8 Conditions (30) and (31) characterize the outcomes of private decisions taken by individual coun-
tries that intertemporally maximize their cumulative payoffs. These outcomes do not necessarily
coincide with the social optimum because individual countries do not consider the external bene-
fits and costs of their switching decisions. However, similar conditions can be obtained for the so-
cial optimum, as shown in Appendix A.4. These conditions imply that the tipping point for the social
optimum (c^	) is always lower than the tipping point for private outcomes (c	). Intuitively, this prop-
erty derives from the fact that technology adoption by one country creates a positive externality
for other countries adopting Technology X.
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this case arises if d2 < 4cx=F and hence the system of differential equations has com-
plex roots. It is easily seen from this inequality that a higher discount rate d and a
higher switching cost F parameter both promote determinacy of the system. This is be-
cause both myopia and high costs of technology switching enhance the relative importance
of current over future payoffs, which are subject to strategic uncertainty. Conversely,
a large cx—which implies that the costs of technology adoption very much depend
on the total number of adopters—promotes indeterminacy of the system, as it makes
countries’ present-value expected payoff more susceptible to others’ technology choices in
the future.
4.2 Equilibrium refinements for coordination games
The issue of coordinating play on one of several possible equilibrium outcomes is at the
core of this and other papers on breakthrough technologies. In any coordination game,
players face strategic uncertainty about the decisions taken by other players. Our theoret-
ical model has shown how introducing dynamics exacerbates strategic uncertainty by creat-
ing indeterminacy. This result highlights the role of expectations that may affect future
technology adoption in a self-fulfilling fashion, leading to the implication that policymakers
may wish to coordinate expectations on an agreement with full adoption. An alternative
approach would have been to incorporate more structure on player’s expectations in the
model and hence to narrow the scope for multiplicity.9 In this subsection, we discuss the
available game theoretical concepts to resolve coordination issues and explain why we have
refrained from using them.
Schelling (1960) pointed out early on that beliefs and perceptions held by players can
help coordinate expectations on certain outcomes that are focal. This is particularly true of
real-life situations where agents’ decisions are embedded in a common temporal, spatial or
cultural context. In the description of the technology adoption game considered above,
however, there is little that would render a particular Nash equilibrium focal in Schelling’s
sense, so this concept is not pursued any further here.
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) defined the notion of risk dominance as an equilibrium re-
finement for (static) coordination games.10 This concept is nicely illustrated for the stage
game depicted in Fig. 2a. If all frontrunners expect followers to adopt Technology X, they
play a coordination game with payoffs represented by the solid lines. It is easily seen that
complete adoption by all frontrunners payoff-dominates the Nash equilibrium with no
adoption. However, notice that a deviation by one of the frontrunners imposes larger losses
on the other adopters than would be the case in the equilibrium with no adoption.
9 We thank an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.
10 For anti-coordination games such as the game of chicken, Aumann (1974) proposed the concept
of correlated equilibrium, where players coordinate expectations on equilibrium play via a third
party that privately instructs players which strategy to play after observing to a randomization de-
vice. We refrain from using correlated equilibria here because, in line with the previous literature,
we think that the choice of the abatement technology is best modelled as a coordination game ra-
ther than an anti-coordination game. Moreover, it would appear heroic to assume that an interna-
tional body such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
could assign equilibrium actions to its member states in private. Rather, it seems that such assign-
ments should be considered public in a post-’Wiki leaks’ world. As a result, the UNFCCC could
only randomize over Nash equilibria of the game, but this is not very plausible.
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Therefore, if frontrunners don’t know for sure which Nash equilibrium is being played,
adopting Technology X is a risky choice whereas conventional abatement is safe. In other
words, the equlibrium without adoption risk-dominates the equilibrium with complete
adoption. Risk dominance seems particularly plausible if pre-play communication is inef-
fective at coordinating expecations, as was conjectured by Aumann (1990). However, at
least in two-player coordination games, lab experiments have shown that cheap talk com-
munication is very effective at enhancing efficiency of the outcome (Charness, 2000).
Moreover, a fair amount of international diplomacy can be considered cheap talk in a
game theoretical sense, and yet it is the prime method of enhancing the efficiency of inter-
governmental interactions. This (along with the lack of an extensive-form game definition),
is the reason why we do not use risk dominance to select among equilibria.
4.3 Social preferences
Our model has emphasized the scale effects of breakthrough technologies which induce
strategic complementarity in the adoption process. While the examples for such technolo-
gies given above are well known in the literature, it bears noting that the fundamental in-
sights of our analysis are much broader. In fact, they equally apply to any factor capable of
creating strategic complementarity in an international environmental treaty. For example,
Lange and Vogt (2003) show that the introduction of equity preferences a la Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) in Barrett’s (1994) model of self-enforcing environmental treaties can sus-
tain full cooperation in settings where regular preferences cannot. This finding is relevant in
our context because a large body of experimental evidence emphasizes the importance of
social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000), and because con-
cerns about fairness have been shown to matter for those actors involved in international
climate negotiations (Lange et al., 2007, 2010). Wagner (2016) presents empirical evidence
that concerns about reputation and fairness created strategic complementarity in the ratifi-
cation process of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer.
Similar to the scale effect of the breakthrough technology, inequality aversion engenders
strategic complementarity in the payoff to joining a treaty. In particular, when countries
care about a fair distribution of the gains of an international environmental treaty, the dy-
namic ratification path can be indeterminate even in the absence of technology external-
ities. Given this indeterminacy, participation in the treaty could be broadened if countries
believe that other countries will become adopters in the future (i.e., ratification becomes
the norm), and vice versa. The only difference is that in eq. (30), the technology term cx will
be replaced by a parameter measuring the inequality aversion. We leave a more detailed
analysis of such a model as a topic for future research.
5. Conclusion
Although the 2015 Paris Agreement prominently features a 2C target for global warming,
it does not stipulate binding targets on carbon emissions. Rather, member states are called
upon to design and implement their own mitigation measures, cautiously referred to as
‘Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs)’. According to the EU commis-
sion, these INDCs ‘are not yet enough to keep global warming below 2C, but the
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agreement traces the way to achieving this target.’11 The theoretical model developed in
this paper sheds light on the conditions under which this statement holds true.
Our analysis is based on a dynamic extension of Barrett’s (2006) model of treaty forma-
tion where countries choose between: (i) a conventional abatement technology that is sub-
ject to decreasing returns; and (ii) a ‘breakthrough technology’ that exhibits a network
externality such that the benefit to adoption increases with the number of other adopters.
Countries evaluate these choices taking into account the expected future benefits and an
increasing (in the number of other countries) cost of switching technologies. We have
shown that, under certain conditions, equilibrium technology choices are indeterminate as
they depend on the future adoption rate, which is subject to strategic uncertainty. An im-
portant implication of this is that expectations about the future outcomes could themselves
influence international cooperation under an IEA that mandates the adoption of a clean
technology.
Our analysis highlights the potential of strategic uncertainty to hinder treaty formation
and suggests two approaches by which policy can mitigate this problem. The first approach
is to reduce strategic uncertainty by managing expectations. This could be implemented,
for example, by setting long-term, non-binding targets for pollution emissions or other out-
comes, so as to coordinate expectations across countries on the path leading to full adop-
tion. As was pointed out above, the fact that limiting the global temperature increase to
2C is the key provision of both the Copenhagen Accord and the Paris Agreement can be in-
terpreted in this way. This target does not require any country to reduce its emissions at
present, but it aligns countries’ expectations and thereby ‘tips’ a future technology treaty to-
wards adoption.
The second approach to reducing strategic uncertainty is by choosing technologies that
minimize the potential for indeterminacy of the dynamic system. Instead of choosing the
most efficient breakthrough technology, policymakers might favour a technology with high
switching cost as this locks the frontrunners into their decisions while also reducing stra-
tegic uncertainty of followers. This aspect of technology adoption arises only in our expli-
citly dynamic framework and thus constitutes an important extension of the second-best
argument by which technologies with scale effects are superior to alternative treaty designs
even if they come at a higher cost because they reduce the incentive to free ride (Barrett,
2006).
For the sake of clarity, we have kept the modelling and discussion deliberately simple.
Our analysis can be extended to consider expectation-driven dynamics that emerge because
of sources of strategic complementarities other than a network externality, e.g., inequality
aversion on the part of treaty participants or trade sanctions imposed on non-signatories.
What is more, our analysis could be extended to IEAs that concern both R&D investment
and technology diffusion, and this will require a proper treatment of irreversibilities.
Another relevant extension would examine the scope for expectations management in an
IEA involving the choice among many technologies that exhibit different cost structures.
These and other extensions are left as topics for future research.
11 Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris/index_en.htm, last accessed
31 October 2016.
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Appendix
A.1 Proof
The given conditions imply kðM0;0; 0Þ>0 and.k1ðM0Þ > 0: Since: f > cxN ð1 þ bÞ, the
function:
kðM0;DM1;DM2Þ  k1ðDM1Þ
is increasing in DM1 (decreasing in DM1) and decreasing in DM2 (increasing in DM2).
As, this means that there is at least one feasible DM1 0 for all DM2 satisfying DM2 0.
Meanwhile, a negative DM2 satisfies the following inequality:
k1ðM0 þ DM1 þ DM2Þ f ðDM2Þ
Since f > cxN ð1 þ bÞ, the function:
k1ðM0 þ DM1 þ DM2Þ  f ðDM2Þ
is increasing in DM2 (decreasing in DM2). As k1ðM1Þ > 0, this means that there is at
least one DM2 0 that satisfies the above inequality for all DM1 such that DM1  0. The
above means that if M0 is located on the left of the tipping point, there is always a feasible
combination of ðDM1;DM2Þ such that DM1;DM2  0.
A.2 Difference equation for k in the discrete game
To characterize the evolution of the relative payoff to adoption, we rewrite the relative pay-
off to adoption for adopters in the kth batch of adopters as follows:
kk ¼
XL
s¼k
bsk bx  cx
N
ðN Ms þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
 
þ b
Lkþ1
1  b bx 
cx
N
 b
2
2c0
 
The relative payoff to adoption for the subsequent batch of adopters kþ1 is given by:
kkþ1 ¼
XL
s¼kþ1
bsðkþ1Þ bx  cx
N
ðN Ms þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
 
þ b
Lk
1  b bx 
cx
N
 b
2
2c0
 
Let d  1bb and calculate:
kkþ1  ð1 þ dÞkk ¼ kkþ1  k
k
b
¼
XL
s¼kþ1
bsðkþ1Þ bx  cx
N
ðN Ms þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
 

XL
s¼k
bsk1 bx  cx
N
ðN Ms þ 1Þ  b
2
2c0
 
¼ 1
b
bx  cx
N
ðN Mk þ 1Þ 
b2
2c0
 
Simple manipulation of this expression yields:
kkþ1  kk ¼ dkk  ð1 þ dÞ bx  cx
N
ðN Mk þ 1Þ 
b2
2c0
 
(32)
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A.3 Difference equation for k with a continuum of countries
kt ¼
X1
s¼t
bst bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
and
ktþ1 ¼
X1
s¼tþ1
bst1 bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
Calculate:
ðktþ1  ktÞ  dkt ¼
X1
s¼tþ1
bsðtþ1Þ bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
ð1 þ dÞ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
¼1=b
X1
s¼t
bst bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
¼
X1
s¼tþ1
bsðtþ1Þ bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 

X1
s¼t
bst1 bx  cxð1  csÞ 
b2
2c0
 
¼  1
b
bx  cxð1  ctÞ 
b2
2c0
 
Hence:
ktþ1  kt ¼ dkt  1b bx  cxð1  ctÞ 
b2
2c0
 
¼ dkt  ð1 þ dÞ bx  cxð1  ctÞ 
b2
2c0
 
A.4 Social optimum (in the continuous-time case)
Taking the perspective of the global social planner, the Hamiltonian of the system is given
by:
H ¼ Nc½bx  cxð1  cÞ þNð1  cÞ b
2
2c0
NF _c
2
2
þNk^ _c
where k^ is the co-state variable representing the shadow value of having an adopter of
Technology X rather than a non-adopter. The control and state variables for the
Hamiltonian are _c and c. The first-order conditions are:
@H
@ _c
¼ NF _c þNk^ ¼ 0
dk^
dt
¼ _^k ¼ dk^  2cxcþ bx  cx  b
2
2c0
 
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Just as in the case of individual countries’ decision-making, this set of equations is solvable,
and now the roots are given by:
q^ ¼ 1
2
d6
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
d2  8cx
F
r" #
The tipping point now becomes:
c^	 ¼ 1
2
1  bx 
b2
2c0
cx
 !
Note that c	 > c^	.
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